Genetec president Pierre Racz. Photo: François Roy, La Presse archives.
Source (in French)Un poids lourd de la vidéosurveillance attaqué chez luilapresse.ca ↗
According to a La Presse article published on November 5, 2026 (in French), masked activists vandalized the Outremont home of Pierre Racz, president of Genetec, on Halloween night. They threw eggs, toilet paper and fireworks, then wrote “PERVERT” on a wall.
The context
The Montréal police (SPVM) run 46 “urban security” cameras. They want to buy 66 more, plus 30 licence plate readers, which would triple the fleet.
The problem
Beyond the surveillance itself, the problem is how the police will use this information and how it is secured.
Inspector Desmarais says the footage is stored on an internal server, that only the investigators involved can access it, and that audit trails would catch any misuse. Let’s break that down.
An internal server?
An internal server does nothing to secure this data. Most cyberattacks spread inside networks to exfiltrate and steal their victims’ data.
Only the investigators involved can access it?
Where is the proof? Where is the transparency on the security testing that was done? Was it done by real experts, or by a three- or four-letter firm that charges a lot but whose testing and testers leave much to be desired?
Why transparency? Because a society that watches must be open to limit abuse. Who will stop an investigator who has the RIGHT to run searches from using the cameras for personal or other purposes? This evidence must be public so citizens can see what is being done and check that it is done right. Of course, that can happen after a delay so ongoing investigations aren’t harmed. There is always a way to be transparent, even on sensitive files!
Audit trails would catch any misuse?
But how are those audit trails implemented? Who tested them? What tests were done?
- Are backups included? And backups of the backups?
- Do the cameras themselves log administrator connections, wired or over Wi-Fi?
- Are the workstations of the officers who download the videos logged too?
- Can these videos be copied to a USB key?
- Can they be uploaded to a web server?
- What are ALL the measures in place?
AND NO, they can’t answer that it’s confidential. Transparency is required here. Until there is transparency, this system can never be considered safe for watching society.
Even worse: an approval behind closed doors
A municipal body reviewed and approved the decision under the privacy law. That decision was not made public.
Another lack of transparency.
- Who did the analysis? Are these people competent?
- Was the analysis done properly?
- Was there any influence?
- Was it, once again, an outside firm?
Where is the report?
“The strictest laws in North America”
Oh yes… Pierre Racz says Québec has some of the strictest privacy laws in North America.
Strong rules, yes. But in January 2026, the CAI (Québec’s privacy regulator) confirmed, in answer to an access-to-information request, that it had imposed no administrative monetary penalty or other penalty since Law 25 came into force, even though it received 518 confidentiality incident notices in 2025 alone. Strict laws without sanctions are just paper.
Accountability?
Accountability done behind closed doors can’t be checked from the outside. We must demand that the privacy impact assessment (PIA) and the municipal decision be published.
Transparency is missing elsewhere too:
- The SPVM first denied knowing about the Genetec Cloudrunner camera installed on Henri-Bourassa Boulevard, then confirmed it had installed and removed it. It refused to say whether other Cloudrunner cameras had been installed elsewhere in the city.
- It also refused to name the vendor of its AI software. According to the CCLA, features of this software can easily be turned on without disclosure.
The right approach: a warrant
Require a search warrant for ANY request to access surveillance camera footage, public or private.
Today, the warrant is the only control that sits outside the system. Without a warrant, everything rests on access management: the accounts, the operators’ workstations, the vendor, the backups and the cold backups. Each of these can fail or be abused.
The SPVM describes our argument itself. All its guarantees are about access management: an internal server, role-based permissions and logging. No judge is involved.
So we’re back to our questions:
- Who manages the accounts?
- Who reviews the logs, and how often? Is anyone outside involved?
- Who has access to the backups and the administrator accounts?
- What can the vendor’s technical support access?
- And so on.
Even worse, logging detects after the fact; it doesn’t prevent. In other words, the SPVM accepts today that abuse will happen and will check everything AFTER THE FACT. Well done.
The evidence already exists
Here is what happens when everything rests on access management:
- Verkada: hackers found the username and password of an administrator account exposed on the internet, then used it to view every customer’s cameras. That included live and archived video, sometimes with sound, of interrogations between police officers and suspects.
- Flock: researchers showed that a sequence of button presses on the back of a camera turns on a Wi-Fi hotspot that gives access to its content. Journalists also found dozens of Flock cameras streaming live on the internet, with no password.
Every extra copy is one more way in: cold backups, exports, vendor access, shared accounts.
The network is already in place in Montréal
- Montréal police have already fitted 30 patrol cars with plate-reading cameras.
- 600 police vehicles will get automatic licence plate readers, and a voluntary registry of private cameras will be set up.
- A Genetec Cloudrunner CR-H2 camera was installed on a lamppost on Henri-Bourassa Boulevard. It also records the colour, make and model of vehicles.
- According to the SPVM, data from its plate readers is kept for five years.
What about blurring?
A camera doesn’t record only your plate or the useful data. It records everything in its field of view.
- Is blurring done at recording time or in post-processing?
- Before or after the backups?
- Before or after the copy to police officers’ and investigators’ computers?
- Who validated the quality of the blurring?
- Can it be turned on or off manually?
- Where are the verification and the audit report? Who did that audit? Are these people competent?
This is only the beginning
The fleet keeps growing. Saying “46 cameras is very few” will still be true at 142 cameras. Without a limit set by law, the fleet will only grow.
A question worth asking: the AI software bought by the SPVM was reportedly designed to analyze 120 live video feeds at once and support at least 700 users. That is far more than the current 46 cameras, and close to the size of the fleet after the purchase.
Do you trust them?
The question from Catherine Dupont-Gagnon, of Cyber Citoyen, settles the debate: are we comfortable with the systematic collection of our licence plates, just in case it might one day help an investigation? That is collection by default. That is the very definition of surveillance.
In Bykovets, the Supreme Court ruled that a warrant is needed to obtain an IP address. It stressed that getting a warrant is not an onerous burden, and that Canada differs from the United States, where information held by a third party loses its expectation of privacy.
So if an IP address requires a warrant, why would five years of your movements require any less?
And for now, SPVM transparency means being “the most transparent possible”. That might not be enough.
Sources
- Un poids lourd de la vidéosurveillance attaqué chez lui (in French) lapresse.ca ↗
- Genetec ALPR removed from Montreal street after public scrutiny biometricupdate.com ↗
- Le SPVM démantèle une caméra de surveillance controversée (in French) noovo.info ↗
- Les policiers du SPVM seront munis de caméras portatives (in French) noovo.info ↗
- Montréal’s voluntary registry of private cameras (in French) montreal.ca ↗
- Montreal police can now monitor the public in real time with AI cultmtl.com ↗
- CAI answer to an access request (AI-2526-238) on Law 25 penalties (in French) cai.gouv.qc.ca ↗
- Hackers breach 150,000 Verkada cameras axios.com ↗
- Verkada breach exposes 150,000 security cameras securitysales.com ↗
- Flock exposed its AI-powered cameras to the internet 404media.co ↗
- Benn Jordan exposes security vulnerabilities in Flock cameras privacyguides.org ↗
- Police need search warrant to get IP address (R. v. Bykovets) canadianlawyermag.com ↗
- SPVM chief promises to be ‘the most transparent possible’ after officers fired youtube.com (CTV News) ↗
